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Abstract
We demonstrate that the disposition of revenues matters for the shape of the govern-
ment’s tax revenue function. The rationale is that existing transfers and expenditures
lead to a capitalization eﬀect when tax rates change that may reinforce or weaken the
overall equilibrium income eﬀect of taxation. We show that the direction and the
strength of the capitalization eﬀect depends on whether tax rate changes are accom-
panied by cash transfers or public spending. Our analysis suggests that high cash
transfers or low public spending make it more likely that a reduction in tax rates will
increase revenues.
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Peachtree St. NE, Atlanta, GA 30309, USA; 404-498-8785; zsolt.becsi@atl.frb.org.Historically, the occurrence of government debt has been associated with wars, but the
past generation has come to know chronic peacetime deﬁcits. In the United States, deﬁcits
are a result of increasing social obligations, high defense expenditures, and a climate that
has favored tax cutting. Whether these trends are a result of social welfare maximization,
optimal voting behavior, or some institutional objectives is open to debate. We will not
pursue the underlying causes for these trends, but instead we show that these trends change
the nature of the government’s revenue function. In particular, we examine claims that a
reduction in tax rates may increase tax revenues if tax rates are too high (the Laﬀer eﬀect).
We show that the disposition of revenues matters for the shape of the government’s tax
revenue function and determines the likelihood of a Laﬀer eﬀect.
The Laﬀer curve popularizes the notion that as tax rates rise, revenues steadily rise from
zero to a peak from which they then decline back to zero. The public ﬁnance literature,
as surveyed by Blinder (1981) and Fullerton (1982), was once comfortable with the classic
smooth and inverted-U shape of the Laﬀer curve. However, Malcolmson (1986) argues
that discontinuities are possible at high tax rates. Gahvari (1988 and 1989) shows that the
discontinuity is likely when tax rate changes are accompanied by public spending rather than
cash transfers. Also, Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1990) indicate that many shapes are possible
in general equilibrium. We share the literature’s interest in the shape of the Laﬀer curve.
But we argue that the preceding analyses are severely restricted because public expenditures
or transfers only serve to accompany tax rate changes. Once this assumption is relaxed, tax
rates have capitalization eﬀects that create non-convexities in the revenue function.
We advance the idea that the revenue-maximizing tax rate and the height of the revenue
function depend on how the government balances its budget. We show this in a simple
general equilibrium model with endogenous consumption and labor that we develop in the
ﬁrst section. The second and third sections consider tax rate changes that are accompanied
by balanced-budget increases in public spending or cash transfers. We show that pre-existing
transfers and expenditures give rise to a capitalization eﬀect when tax rates increase. The
capitalization eﬀect may either oﬀs e to rr e i n f o r c et h ei n c o m ee ﬀect of higher tax rates on
1aggregate labor and, thus, push labor to a corner and cause non-convexities in the revenue
function. We, also, show that some tax policies cause real capital losses that lengthen the
upward-sloping portion of the revenue function relative to the downward-sloping portion and
make Laﬀer eﬀects less likely. Other tax policies may cause capital gains with the opposite
eﬀect on the revenue function. We characterize the shape of the equilibrium revenue function
for various tax policies and show how the shape changes with changes in existing transfers
and expenditures. A ﬁnal section summarizes our results and we conclude that Laﬀer eﬀects
are more likely when cash transfers are large or public spending is small.
1 A Simple Static General Equilibrium Model
We consider a representative household that chooses consumption c and leisure to maximize
its utility subject to a budget constraint. Because leisure equals the time not devoted to
market work, or 1 − h ∈ (0,1), we write preferences as
cβ
β
+ α
(1 − h)θ
θ
where the parameter α > 0 indicates the relative desirability of leisure. To sharpen our
results, we assume separability between consumption and leisure and symmetry by setting
β = θ. We focus mainly on β ∈ [0,1), but we admit the possibility that β / ∈ [0,1].1
The budget constraint for the household equates consumption to after-tax labor income
and transfers, or
c =( 1− t)wh+ v (1)
where the labor tax rate is given by t, the wage rate is w and lump-sum transfers is v.
Firms are assumed to be competitive and choose the amount of the labor input that
maximizes proﬁts. Output is produced using a linear production function Ah.
1Of course, our results are also more focussed by assuming utility functions with constant elasticity. The
leading case in the literature is when β ∈ (0,1), but the logarithmic case where β → 0a l s oh a sb e e np o p u l a r
despite shortcomings that are discussed in the next section. Later we consider β / ∈ [0,1] which has been
discussed by others such as Gahvari (1988) who assumed β = −1.
2The government pursues a balanced budget policy and sets the sum of expenditures g
and transfers equal to revenues R, where revenues are a result of taxes on labor income.
Thus, budget balance means
g + v = R = twh (2)
Finally, market clearing in the goods market is given by
c + g = Ah (3)
Because government spending only enters the market clearing condition, we are in eﬀect
assuming that spending aﬀects utility separably. Thus, we ignore the public good aspects
of government spending and focus only on the demand side.
An equilibrium for this model is deﬁned as a (c∗,h ∗)-pair that satisﬁes market clearing
and is optimal in the sense of maximizing the objectives of ﬁrms and households subject
to the relevant constraints and given the government variables and spending rules. In
particular, household optimization implies
c
1 − h
= M ≡
·
(1 − t)
A
α
¸ 1
1−β
(4)
where w = A has been imposed from proﬁt maximization. Thus, equations (3) and (4)
together with the spending rule in (2) determine equilibrium consumption and labor.
If we substitute (3) into (4), we ﬁnd that equilibrium consumption is:
c
∗ (t,g)=
A − g
1+ A
M
(5)
where market clearing implies that A ≥ g because h ∈ [0,1]. To ﬁnd the equilibrium
quantity of labor we substitute (5) into (3), yielding
h
∗ (t,g)=
1+
g
M
1+ A
M
(6)
Thus, the tax rate reduces equilibrium labor by an amount that depends on g.T h e l a s t
two relationships are appropriate when analyzing tax rate changes that are accompanied by
budget-balancing lump-sum transfers.
3To analyze the eﬀects of tax rate changes that are accompanied by budget-balancing
public expenditures, we substitute t − v
Ah∗ =
g
Ah∗ from (2) into (6). Thus,
h
∗ (t,v)=
1 − v
M
1+
(1−t)A
M
(7)
And if we substitute 1 − h∗ into (4) we ﬁnd
c
∗ (t,v)=
(1 − t)A + v
1+
(1−t)A
M
(8)
Now the eﬀects of a tax rate change on labor are less clear than before, depending on whether
transfers are positive or negative.2 Next, we explore the various possibilities in detail.
2T a x E ﬀects under Logarithmic Utility
We now analyze the aggregate labor and revenue eﬀects of a change in tax rates. In order
to develop intuition about possible eﬀects, this section analyzes the logarithmic utility case
where β → 0. After showing the shortcomings of this form of preferences, the next section
m o v e st ot h el e a d i n gc a s eo fβ ∈ (0,1).
To analyze the labor eﬀects of taxation, we rewrite (6) and (7) as
h
∗ (t,v)=
1 − v
M
1+ 1
Mβ
and h
∗ (t,g)=
1+
g
M
1+ 1
M
(9)
and note that for the logarithmic utility case, M =1− t and Mβ =1 . Without any loss in
g e n e r a l i t y ,w eh a v ea s s u m e di n( 9 )t h a tα =1a n dA =1 . The latter normalization means
that government transfers and expenditures, in particular, are all less than or equal to one.3
Moreover, equilibrium tax revenues are given by R(t,·)=th∗ (t,·).
When v = 0 in (9), labor is independent of tax rate changes that are accompanied
by public spending adjustments. The intuition for the neutrality of taxes for labor is
2Public spending raises labor in (6) while transfers reduce labor in (7). The two outcomes are equivalent,
because lower transfers ﬁnance higher spending in the ﬁrst case and lower spending ﬁnances higher transfers
in the second case. Budget balance implies dh∗ (t,g)=
∂h∗(t,g)
∂g dg = −
∂h∗(t,g)
∂g
³
1 − t
∂Ah∗(t,g)
∂v
´−1
dv. By
comparison, dh∗ (t,v)=
∂h∗(t,v)
∂v dv and it can easily be shown that
∂h∗(t,v)
∂v = −
∂h∗(t,g)
∂g
³
1 − t
∂Ah∗(t,g)
∂v
´−1
.
3While a decrease in α or an increase in A from unity would raise M and lead to a higher equilibrium
level of labor, the qualitative eﬀects of tax rate changes on labor are unchanged.
4well known. Higher tax rates lower net wages and this yields a substitution eﬀect that
reduces equilibrium labor. At the same time, lower net wages cause a negative income
eﬀect that increases equilibrium labor. Also, because higher public spending increases the
drain on net resources available to individuals, there is an additional negative income eﬀect.
For logarithmic preferences, the combined income eﬀect just oﬀsets the substitution eﬀect.
Thus, taxes are neutral for labor and revenues rise monotonically from zero when t =0
to 1
2 when t = 1. While this illustration is instructive, it also shows that the solution in
(9) is incomplete, because intuition indicates that labor should be zero when all wages are
conﬁscated. In other words, taxes create a discontinuity at t = 1 with labor and revenues
falling to zero.4
Non-zero transfers (or v 6= 0) imply an additional income eﬀect that changes the nature
of labor’s response to tax rate changes. When cash transfers are positive, labor falls when
tax rates rise. The rationale for this result is that taxes now have a capitalization eﬀect by
raising the leisure value 1
M of existing transfer income. Higher tax rates create a real capital
gain with a positive income eﬀect that reduces labor. Because income and substitution
eﬀects just oﬀset each other when transfers were zero, the new capitalization eﬀect stands
alone and labor falls with higher tax rates. By contrast, when transfers are negative, labor
rises because of a real capital loss.
The capitalization eﬀect of tax rate changes when v 6= 0 creates a non-convexity in the
labor and the revenue functions. Suppose for ease of comparison that |v| = g. If transfers
are negative (or v = −g), the revenue function rises monotonically from zero when t =0t o
unity as t rises to 1 − g. Because labor is bounded by unity, tax rates higher than 1 − g
have no eﬀect on labor. This non-convexity in the labor function implies a non-convexity
in the revenue function with R(t,v = −g)=t for t ∈ [1 − g,1]. By contrast when v = g,
revenues rise from zero when t =0t oam a x i m u mo ft2
2 at t∗ (v = g)=1− g
1
2 and then
fall to zero at t =1− g. If tax rates were pushed even higher towards one, revenues would
rapidly approach negative inﬁnity according to (9), but because this is impossible there is a
non-convexity with labor and tax revenues remaining at zero for t ∈ [1 − g,1].
4Malcolmson (1986) and Gahvari (1988 and 1989) also discuss the discontinuity at t =1 .
5When lump-sum transfers accompany higher tax rates instead of public expenditures,
we ﬁnd that labor h∗ (t,g) falls. There are two distinct reasons for this response. The
ﬁrst reason is that the substitution eﬀect of higher taxes dominates the income eﬀect when
lump-sum transfers adjust. Budget-balancing transfers create a positive income eﬀect that
oﬀs e t st h en e g a t i v ei n c o m ee ﬀect of the tax rate change on equilibrium labor. The second
reason is that non-zero public spending creates a capitalization eﬀect on labor that acts
like the capitalization eﬀect on labor when v<0. Higher tax rates raise the leisure value
of the drain on resources and cause a capital loss. Thus, the capitalization eﬀect slows
the overall fall of labor as tax rates rise. As tax rates move from zero towards one, labor
falls by
1−g
2 with the drop declining as g increases. While the capitalization eﬀect is too
weak to create a non-convexity, there still remains a discontinuity of the labor function at
t =1 . Equation (9) suggests labor falls smoothly towards g as tax rates approach unity,
but at t = 1 labor must fall to zero. Thus, except for the discontinuity t =1 , the revenue
function takes on the classic inverted-U Laﬀer shape with a revenue-maximizing tax rate
of t∗ (g ≥ 0) = inf
³
2 −
q
2(1− g),1
´
.A h i g h e r g increases t∗ and lengthens the upward-
sloping portion of the revenue function relative to the downward-sloping portion.
We summarize our ﬁndings for the logarithmic case in Figure 1 below, where for compa-
rability we assume |v| = g. W en o t et h a tt a x e sc r e a t ec a p i t a ll o s s e sf o rh∗ (t,v = −g)a n d
h∗ (t,g > 0) and capital gains for h∗ (t,v = −g). The ﬁgure suggests the following ranking
of revenue functions:
R(t,v = −g) >R(t,v =0 )>R(t,g > 0) >R(t,g =0 )>R(t,v = g)f o rt ∈ (0,1)
with revenue-maximizing tax rates following the same order except that t∗ (v = −g)a n d
t∗ (v = 0) both tend to one. As we show in the next section this ordering does not generalize
t ot h ec a s eo fβ ∈ (0,1). However, the conclusion remains that positive transfers and limited
public spending imply Laﬀer eﬀects, while negative transfers rule them out.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Labor and Tax Revenues Assuming Logarithmic Utility
3 General Tax Eﬀects on Labor and Revenues
In this section we broaden our scope and analyze the labor and revenue eﬀects of taxation
for β ∈ [0,1). The last section indicated that higher tax rates lead to discontinuities and
non-convexities in the labor and revenue functions. Thus, we extend (9) to indicate where
the critical areas are located. Assuming α = A =1a n d|v| = g ≥ 0, the solution for
equilibrium labor when β ∈ [0,1) is:
h
∗ (t,v = g)=

      
      
(1−t)
1
1−β −g
(1−t)
1
1−β +(1−t)
for t ∈
h
0,1 − g1−β
i
0f o r t ∈
h
1 − g1−β,1
i

      
      
(10a)
h
∗ (t,v = −g)=

           
           
(1−t)
1
1−β +g
(1−t)
1
1−β +(1−t)
for t ∈ [0,1 − g]
1f o r t ∈ [1 − g,1)
0f o r t =1

           
           
(10b)
7h
∗ (t,g)=

     
     
(1−t)
1
1−β +g
(1−t)
1
1−β +1
for t ∈ [0,1)
0f o r t =1

     
     
(10c)
The leading case of β ∈ (0,1) diﬀers in two signiﬁcant ways from the logarithmic case.
Now, when transfers are zero, tax increases that are accompanied by public spending adjust-
ments tend to reduce labor. As taxes rise from zero to unity, labor falls smoothly from 1
2 to
zero. Thus, the substitution eﬀect on equilibrium labor outweighs the combined negative
income eﬀect from higher taxes and spending. Also, there is no discontinuity in labor as
tax rates rise towards unity. In this case, we have the classic Laﬀer shape of the revenue
function. Revenues rise from zero at t = 0 to a maximum after which revenues fall to zero
as tax rates approach unity.5
While a tax-with-spending increase when v = 0 is qualitatively diﬀerent for β ∈ (0,1)
than for β → 0, this is not true for the same experiment when v 6=0 . However, a tax-with-
transfers increase does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly for β ∈ (0,1) and β → 0. To see this most
easily we graph the equilibrium labor functions from equations (10a) through (10c) and the
associated revenue functions in Figure 2 for the illustrative case of β = 1
2.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Labor and Revenue Functions Assuming β = 1
2
5The revenue-maximizing tax rate t∗ solves
β
1−β =( 1− t) 1
1−β +( 1− t)
1
1−β . If β = 1
2,t ∗ =2−
√
2.
8The capitalization eﬀe c to fh i g h e rt a x e si saf a c t o ri nt h er e s p o n s eo fl a b o rw h e nv 6=0
and spending accompanies tax changes or when g 6= 0 and transfers accompany tax changes.
Speciﬁcally, when higher tax rates are accompanied by public spending, a capital loss occurs
when v<0 and a capital gain occurs when v>0. As before, the income eﬀect of the capital
loss when v = −g causes labor to rise as the tax rate rises and forces labor to unity at
t ≥ 1−g. However, the income eﬀect of the capital gain when v = g pushes labor to zero for
t ≥ 1−g1−β, or much earlier than indicated by log preferences. When transfers accompany
tax rate increases, taxes again cause capital losses when g>0t h a tw e a k e n st h en e g a t i v e
response of labor. For higher tax rates this means that labor becomes less responsive to tax
increases and the tax elasticity diminishes.
Revenue functions generally have the same shape for β ∈ (0,1) as when β → 0. The main
exception is that R(t,v = 0) now has the classic Laﬀer look. The revenue functions for the
other experiments diﬀer mainly in the details with the capitalization eﬀects of tax changes
a prime factor in determining the shape. A capital gain occurs for R(t,v = g)w h e nv>0
and public spending accompanies higher tax rates. The capital gain tends to shorten the
upward-sloping region of the revenue function and lengthen the downward-sloping region.
Thus, the capital gain reduces the revenue-maximizing tax rate for R(t,v = g)a sc o m p a r e d
to R(t,v =0 ). Higher cash transfers increase the capital gain and cause a reduction in
R(t,v = g)f o ra l lt, a decrease in the revenue-maximizing tax rate t∗ (v = g), and an increase
of the region where tax revenues are zero.
By contrast, tax rates create capital losses for R(t,v = −g)a n dR(t,g > 0). Capi-
tal losses tend to lengthen the upward-sloping region of the revenue function and shorten
the downward-sloping region. In other words, when tax rates create capital losses the
revenue-maximizing tax rate rises compared to situations without capitalization eﬀects.
Thus, comparing revenue-maximizing tax rates, we see that t∗ (v = −g) >t ∗ (v =0 )a n d
t∗ (g>0) >t ∗ (g =0 ). When public spending accompanies higher tax rates and v = −g,
the capitalization eﬀect of tax rates is enhanced the larger is |v|, in which case revenues rise
faster to their upper bound at t =1− g. Alternatively, when transfers accompany higher
9tax rates, higher pre-existing public spending enhances the capital loss. This stretches the
upward-sloping region of the revenue function, raises R(t,g > 0) at all t and also increases
the revenue-maximizing tax rate.
We can easily compare revenue functions and revenue-maximizing tax rates. It is al-
ways true for β ∈ [0,1) that R(t,v = −g) >R(t,v =0 )>R(t,v = g)a n dR(t,g > 0) >
R(t,g =0 )f o rt ∈ (0,1). However, R(t,v =0 )>R(t,g =0 )f o rβ ∈ (0,1), whereas the
opposite is true for β → 0. If we assume β ∈ (0,1) and if we set |v| = g, we can make
comparisons of tax-and-spend policies and tax-and-transfer policies. In particular we, ﬁnd
R(t,v = −g) >R(t,g > 0) >R(t,v =0 )>R(t,g =0 )>R(t,v = g)f o r a l l t ∈ (0,1)
Generally, revenue-maximizing tax rates follow the same order as the revenue functions.
These rankings suggest that Laﬀer eﬀects are more likely for R(t,v = g) when cash transfers
are high, but more likely for R(t,g > 0) when public spending is low. Laﬀer eﬀects are ruled
out for R(t,v = −g). Thus, lowering tax rates does not seem to promise higher revenues
given that these conditions are counterfactual. However, if revenue-maximization is an
over-riding concern, the analysis suggests that because the disposition of revenues matters
all available policy instruments (t, v, and g) should be used and the highest feasible revenue
function should be chosen. The ﬁrst choice R(t,v = −g) is based on politically unpopular
poll taxes, while the second choice R(t,g > 0) rises with g and encourages government bloat.
Finally, we brieﬂy describe what happens when β < 0.6 As before, higher tax rates
accompanied by transfers reduce labor when public spending is zero, or h∗ (t,g =0 ). How-
ever, in contrast to the response when β ∈ (0,1), higher tax rates accompanied by public
spending increase labor when transfers are zero, or h∗ (t,v =0 ). Thus, h∗ (t,g =0 )s l o p e s
downward but h∗ (t,v = 0) slopes upward. The reason for this is that when β < 0s u b s t i -
tution eﬀects are relatively weaker than when β ∈ (0,1). For h∗ (t,g =0 ), the combined
income eﬀect of higher transfers and tax rates on equilibrium labor still is zero. However,
6For instance, Gahvari (1988) assumes β = −1s ot h a tM ≡ (1 − τ)
1
2and Mβ ≡ (1 − τ)
− 1
2 in equation
(9). Thus, when β < 0o n l yM−β is a decreasing function of t, while M−1 is an increasing function. By
contrast, when β ∈ (0,1), tax rates increase M−1 and M−β. Finally, we note that capitalization eﬀects
depend on the response of M−1 to t.
10for h∗ (t,v =0 ), t h ec o m b i n e dn e g a t i v ei n c o m ee ﬀect of higher public spending and tax rates
is now suﬃciently strong to overwhelm the substitution eﬀe c to fh i g h e rt a xr a t e s .
Also, the capitalization eﬀects when β < 0 work in the same direction as when β ∈ (0,1).
Thus, taxes create capital losses for h∗ (t,v = −g)a n dh∗ (t,g > 0) and capital gains for
h∗ (t,v = −g). This means that the shape of h∗ (t,g > 0) and R(t,g > 0) for β < 0i s
essentially unchanged from β ∈ (0,1). Given that h∗ (t,v = 0) slopes up, capitalization
eﬀects mean that h∗ (t,v = −g) moves to one faster than before and h∗ (t,v = g)m o v e st o
zero slower than before when β ∈ (0,1). Beyond this, the shape of revenue functions for
β < 0r e s e m b l et h o s ef o rβ ∈ (0,1). The diﬀerence is that the upward-sloping region for
β < 0 increases relative to the downward-sloping region. Thus, assuming β < 0m a k e s
Laﬀer eﬀects less likely than assuming β ∈ (0,1).7
4 Summary and Conclusions
We analyze the eﬀects of labor taxation in a simple but standard static general equilibrium
model. We show that higher tax rates have capitalization eﬀects that depend on the dis-
position of government revenues. The capitalization eﬀect must be added to the combined
equilibrium income eﬀect of a tax-and-spend policy or a tax-and-transfer policy. The capi-
talization eﬀect reshapes the government’s equilibrium revenue function in two ways. First,
capital gains shorten and capital losses lengthen the upward-sloping region of the revenue
function relative to the downward-sloping region. Second, the capitalization eﬀect may lead
to non-convexities in the revenue function.
Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that if budget-balancing lump-sum transfers accompany
tax rate changes, higher tax rates create capital losses that increase with existing public
expenditures. Thus, we conclude that low public spending increases the likelihood of Laﬀer
eﬀects, but at the cost of fewer publicly provided goods. Alternatively, we show that if
7Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, we note that the quadratic utility function with β =2i s
an example of β > 1w h e r eM ≡ (1 − τ)
− 1
2 and Mβ ≡ (1 − τ)
−1 . When β > 1, both M−1 and M−β are
decreasing functions of t. Thus, both h∗ (t,v =0 )a n dh∗ (t,g = 0) slope upward. Moreover, capital losses
under β < 1 turn into capital gains under β > 1a n dvice versa. T h i sr e v e r s e st h er a n k i n g sf o rt h el a b o r
and revenue functions under β < 1.
11budget-balancing public expenditures accompany tax rate changes, higher tax rates create
capitalization eﬀects that depend on the sign and the size of initial transfers. If cash
transfers are negative a capital loss results that pushes labor towards its upper bound and
creates an upward-sloping revenue function. Alternatively, if cash transfers are positive a
capital gain occurs that pushes labor towards zero, increasing the downward-sloping region
of the revenue function but also creating a region where revenues are zero at high tax rates.
Because the capitalization eﬀects increase with the size of existing transfers, we conclude
that high positive cash transfers increase the likelihood of Laﬀer eﬀects, but at a cost of a
low revenue yield overall.
Our ﬁndings on the capitalization eﬀects of taxation should carry over to environments
with more general preferences and technologies than considered here. It would be interesting
to know how our results change when more realistic forms of transfers (with incentive eﬀects)
and public spending (with public goods aspects) are considered. Finally, while the static
revenue eﬀects of labor taxes in our model carry over to dynamic environments, it would be
interesting to see how they compare with the dynamic revenue eﬀects of labor taxes. Some
arguments about the possibility of Laﬀer eﬀects stress the growth eﬀects of taxation. But
such arguments must be weighed against the level eﬀects of taxation that are considered
here.
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